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Recently, a chaos-based image encryption algorithm called MCKBA (Modified Chaotic-Key
Based Algorithm) was proposed. This paper analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that it
can be broken with a differential attack, which requires only four chosen plain-images. Perfor-
mance of the attack is verified by experimental results. In addition, some defects of MCKBA,
including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, are reported.
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1. Introduction
Rapid development of information technology and popularization of digital products require that mul-
timedia data are transmitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more frequently. Therefore,
secure delivery of multimedia data becomes increasingly important. However, traditional text encryption
schemes fail to be competent for the task due to the big differences between textual and multimedia
data. Under the pressure of this challenge, researchers attempted to propose special multimedia encryption
schemes utilizing all kinds of nonlinear theories in the past decade. The subtle similarity between chaos
and cryptography makes chaos considered as an ideal tool to design secure and efficient encryption schemes
and a great number of multimedia encryption schemes based on it have been presented [Chen & Yen, 2003;
Chen et al., 2004; Pisarchik et al., 2006; Xiang et al., 2007; Ye, 2010; Wong et al., 2010]. Unfortunately,
many of them have been found to be insecure and/or incomplete from the viewpoint of modern cryptology
[Wang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008b,a; Arroyo et al., 2008; Rhouma & Belghith, 2008; Zhou & Au, 2008;
Solak & Cokal, 2009; Li et al., 2009b,a; Solak et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2011]. References [A´lvarez & Li,
2006; Li et al., 2004b] conclude some general rules about evaluating the security of chaos-based encryption
schemes.
In [Yen & Guo, 2000], a chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) for image encryption was proposed.
The algorithm encrypts each pixel by four possible operations: XORing or XNORing it with one of two
predefined sub-keys. A pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS), obtained from a one-dimensional chaotic
system, is used to determine which operation is exerted. As shown in [Li & Zheng, 2002], CKBA can be
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easily broken with only one known/chosen-image. To enhance security of CKBA against known/chosen-
plaintext attack, [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] proposes a modified chaotic-key based algorithm (MCKBA) by
employing a modular addition operation like [Socek et al., 2005]. To further enhance the security against
brute-force attack, [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010] replaces the one-dimensional chaotic system generating PRNS
with a simple hyperchaos generator proposed in [Takahashi et al., 2004] and names the algorithm HCKBA
(Hyper Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm). Since the two schemes MCKBA and HCKBA share the same
structure, this paper only analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that the scheme can be broken with
only four chosen plain-images. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to support
the conclusion. In addition, some other security defects of MCKBA, including insensitivity with respect to
changes of plain-image/secret key, are discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The image encryption algorithm under study is introduced
in Sec. 2. Detailed cryptanalysis on the algorithm is presented in Sec. 3 with experimental results. The last
section concludes this paper.
2. Modified Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm (MCKBA)
The plaintext encrypted by MCKBA is a gray-scale image of size M ×N (width×height). The plain-image
is scanned in the raster order and represented as a 1D signal I = {I(i)}MN−1i=0 . Then, a binary sequence
Ib = {Ib(l)}8MN−1l=0 is constructed, where
∑7
j=0 Ib(8 · i+ j) · 2j = I(i) ∀ i ∈ {0, · · · ,MN − 1}. With a pre-
defined integer parameter n, an n-bit number sequence J = {J(i)}d8MN/ne−1i=0 is generated for encryption,
where J(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 Ib(n · i + j) · 2j . Note that sequence Ib is padded with some zero bits if (8MN) is
not a multiple of n. Without loss of generality, assume n can divide (8MN) here. MCKBA operate on
the intermediate sequence J and get J ′ = {J ′(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 , where J ′(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 I
′
b(n · i + j) · 2j . Finally,
cipher-image I ′ = {I ′(i)}MN−1i=0 is obtained, where I ′(i) =
∑7
j=0 I
′
b(8 · i+ j) · 2j . With the above notations,
MCKBA can be described as follows1.
• The secret key : two random numbers key1, key2 ∈ {0, · · · , 2n− 1}, and the initial condition x(0) ∈ (0, 1)
of the following chaotic Logistic map:
x(i+ 1) = 3.9 · x(i) · (1− x(i)), (1)
where
∑n−1
j=0 (key1,j ⊕ key2,j) = dn/2e, key1 =
∑n−1
j=0 key1,j · 2j , key2 =
∑n−1
j=0 key2,j · 2j , and ⊕ denotes
eXclusive OR (XOR) operation.
• Initialization: run the chaotic system to generate a chaotic sequence, {x(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 . From the 32-bit
binary representation of x(i) =
∑32
j=1 b(32 · i + j − 1) · 2−j , derive a pseudo-random binary sequence
(PRBS), {b(l)}16MN/n−1l=0 .• Encryption: for the i-th plain-element J(i), i = 0 ∼ 8MN/n− 1, the corresponding cipher-element J ′(i)
is determined by the following rule:
J ′(i) =

(J(i)u key1)⊕ key1, if B(i) = 3,
(J(i)u key1) key1, if B(i) = 2,
(J(i)u key2)⊕ key2, if B(i) = 1,
(J(i)u key2) key2, if B(i) = 0,
(2)
where B(i) = 2 · b(2i) + b(2i + 1), a u b = (a + b) mod 2n and  denotes XNOR operation. Since
1To make the presentation more concise and consistent, some notations in the original paper [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] are
modified, and some details of MCKBA are also supplied.
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a b = a⊕ b = a⊕ b¯, the above equation is equivalent to
J ′(i) =

(J(i)u key1)⊕ key1, if B(i) = 3,
(J(i)u key1)⊕ key1, if B(i) = 2,
(J(i)u key2)⊕ key2, if B(i) = 1,
(J(i)u key2)⊕ key2, if B(i) = 0.
(3)
• Decryption: the decryption procedure is similar to that of the encryption, but with Eq. (3) replaced by
following
J(i) =

(J ′(i)⊕ key1)−˙key1, if B(i) = 3,
(J ′(i)⊕ key1)−˙key1, if B(i) = 2,
(J ′(i)⊕ key2)−˙key2, if B(i) = 1,
(J ′(i)⊕ key2)−˙key2, if B(i) = 0,
(4)
where a−˙b = (a− b+ 2n) mod 2n.
3. Cryptanalysis
3.1. The Differential Attack
Differential attack is usually a chosen-plaintext attack, assuming that the attacker can obtain cipertexts for
some set of chosen plaintexts. The goal of the attack is to gain information about the secret key or plaintext
by analyzing how differences in the chosen plaintexts affect the resultant difference at the corresponding
ciphertexts. Note that difference is defined with respect to any given operation, e.g., XOR. In [Rao &
Gangadhar, 2007, III.B] and [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010, Sec. 3.2], the authors claimed that MCKBA is very
robust against chosen-plaintext attack. However, we will show how it can be broken very easily with only
four chosen plain-images.
Since plain-image and intermediate sequences J can be obtained from each other without any secret
key, choosing the former is actually equivalent to choosing the latter. If two known intermediate sequences
J1 = {J1(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 and J2 = {J2(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 are encrypted with the same secret key, their corresponding
encrypted results J ′1 = {J ′1(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 and J ′2 = {J ′2(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 satisfy the following relation
J ′1(i)⊕ J ′2(i) =
{
(J1(i)u key1)⊕ (J2(i)u key1), if B(i) ∈ {2, 3},
(J1(i)u key2)⊕ (J2(i)u key2), if B(i) ∈ {0, 1}.
(5)
Regardless the value of B(i), (J ′1(i)⊕ J ′2(i)) can be represented by an equation in the following form
y = (au x)⊕ (bu x), (6)
where a, b, x, y ∈ {0, · · · , 2n − 1}.
The following theorem discusses how to solve the above equation.
Theorem 1. Assume that a, b, x are all n-bit integers, then a lower bound on the number of queries (a, b)
to solve Eq. (6) for any x is (i) 0 if n = 1; (ii) 1 if n = 2; (iii) 2 if n = 3; or (iv) 3 if n ≥ 4.
Proof. First, rewrite Eq. (6) as the following equivalent form
y˜ = y ⊕ a⊕ b = (au x)⊕ (bu x)⊕ a⊕ b. (7)
Let x =
∑n−1
j=0 xj · 2j , a =
∑n−1
j=0 aj · 2j , b =
∑n−1
j=0 bj · 2j , and y˜ =
∑n−1
j=0 y˜j · 2j . Then, except y˜0 ≡ 0, Eq. (7)
can be decomposed into the following iteration form ci+1 = (xi · ai)⊕ (xi · ci)⊕ (ai · ci),c˜i+1 = (xi · bi)⊕ (xi · c˜i)⊕ (bi · c˜i),
y˜i+1 = ci+1 ⊕ c˜i+1,
(8)
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where i ∈ {0, · · · , n− 2}, c0 = 0, c˜0 = 0.
Table 1 lists the values of y˜i+1 under all possible different values of ai, bi, y˜i, xi, ci. From Table 1, one
can see that the values of unknown bit xi can be determined if and only if (ai, bi, y˜i) falls in the 1, 2, 4,
7-th column (zero-based) of the table, namely
(ai + bi · 2 + y˜i · 22) ∈ {1, 2, 4, 7}. (9)
Table 1. The values of y˜i+1 corresponding to the values of ai, bi, y˜i, xi, ci.
(xi, ci)
(ai, bi, y˜i)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
(0, 0) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
(0, 1) 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
(1, 0) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
(1, 1) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
When n = 1, Eq. (7) becomes y˜ ≡ 0. So, no pair of (a, b) is required to achieve the value of x. Since
y˜n−1 bears no relation with xn−1, we only need to discuss how to obtain the (n − 1) least significant bits
of x for other values of n.
• n = 2: Since y˜0 = 0, c0 = 0, one can get x0 = y˜1 by setting (a0, b0) = (1, 0);
• n = 3: No matter what (a0, b0) is, y1 ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain x1 with only
set of (a1, b1) for any x. Select (a, b) satisfying that (a0, b0) = (1, 0), get x0 as the above case. Let
(a1, b1) = (1, 0), x1 can be determined if y1 = 0; otherwise we have to resort to another query (a
′, b′). Let
y˜′ =
∑n−1
j=0 y˜
′
j · 2j denote the output of Eq. (7) corresponding to the second query. Set (a′0, b′0) = (a0, b0)
and (a′1, b′1) = (1, 1) if y1 = 1, then we can get x1 = y′2;
• n ≥ 4: In this case, (y˜1, y˜2) and (y˜′1, y˜′2) can be all possible values. Observing Table 1, it can be easily
verified that there is no (a, b) and (a′, b′) satisfying either Eq. (9) or
(a′i + b
′
i · 2 + y˜′i · 22) ∈ {1, 2, 4, 7} (10)
for i = 1, 2. This means x2 cannot always be determined. Therefore, we need one more
query (a? =
∑n−1
j=0 a
?
j · 2j , b? =
∑n−1
j=0 b
?
j · 2j). Let y˜? =
∑n−1
j=0 y˜
?
j · 2j denote the correspond-
ing output with respect to Eq. (7). Given a set of (ai+k, bi+k, a
′
i+k, b
′
i+k, a
?
i+k, b
?
i+k), one can get
(ci+k+1, y˜i+k+1, c
′
i+k+1, y˜
′
i+k+1, c
?
i+k+1, y˜
?
i+k+1) from (ci+k, y˜i+k, c
′
i+k, y˜
′
i+k, c
?
i+k, y˜
?
i+k) and value of xi+k,
where i, k ∈ Z. Let arrows of plain head and “V-back” head denote xi+k = 0 and xi+k = 1
respectively, Figure 1 illustrates mapping relationship between (ci+k, y˜i+k, c
′
i+k, y˜
′
i+k, c
?
i+k, y˜
?
i+k) and
(ci+k+1, y˜i+k+1, c
′
i+k+1, y˜
′
i+k+1, c
?
i+k+1, y˜
?
i+k+1) for a given (ai+k, bi+k, a
′
i+k, b
′
i+k, a
?
i+k, b
?
i+k), where k =
0, 1, 2. Since (c0, y˜0, c
′
0, y˜
′
0, c
?
0, y˜
?
0) ≡ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), the dashed arrows in Fig. 1 describe Eq. (8) with the
three sets of (a, b) for i = 0, 1, 2. Note that the data in the fourth column of the table shown in Fig. 1
is exactly the same as the first one. Therefore, Fig. 1 shows calculation of Eq. (7) under all different bit
levels if the variable i shown in Fig. 1 go through 3 · t, where t = 0 ∼ bn/3c and i + k ≤ n − 1. From
Fig. 1, it can be easily verified that the following relationship(
ai+k + bi+k · 2 + y˜i+k · 22, a′i+k + b′i+k · 2 + y˜′i+k · 22, a?i+k + b?i+k · 2 + y˜?i+k · 22
) ∩ {1, 2, 4, 7} 6= ∅ (11)
is always satisfied, which means xi+k can be derived from Table 3.1. This completes the proof.

Corollary 3.1. The (n − 1) least significant bits of x in Eq. (6) can be determined easily by setting (a, b)
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⋆
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Fig. 1. Relationship between (ci+k, y˜i+k, c
′
i+k, y˜
′
i+k, c
?
i+k, y˜
?
i+k) and (ci+k+1, y˜i+k+1, c
′
i+k+1, y˜
′
i+k+1, c
?
i+k+1, y˜
?
i+k+1) for a
given (ai+k, bi+k, a
′
i+k, b
′
i+k, a
?
i+k, b
?
i+k), where k = 0, 1, 2.
with the following three sets of numbers{(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(100)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n,
(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(111)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n
}
;{(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(100)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n,
(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(001)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n
}
;{(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(011)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n,
(∑dn/3e−1
j=0
(001)2 · 8j
)
mod 2n
}
and checking the corresponding y˜ = y ⊕ a⊕ b.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. 
Proposition 1. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers, n ∈ Z+, one has the following two equations
(a⊕ x)−˙x = (a⊕ x⊕ 2n−1)−˙(x⊕ 2n−1), (12)
(a⊕ x)−˙x = (a⊕ x⊕ 2n−1)−˙(x⊕ 2n−1). (13)
Proof. Eq. (12) can be proved under four conditions. i) When (a ⊕ x) ≥ 2n−1 and x ≥ 2n−1: (a ⊕ x ⊕
2n−1)−˙(x⊕2n−1) = ((a⊕x)−2n−1)−˙(x−2n−1) = (((a⊕x)−2n−1)−(x−2n−1)+2n) mod 2n = (a⊕x)−˙x;
ii) When (a ⊕ x) ≥ 2n−1 and x < 2n−1: (a ⊕ x ⊕ 2n−1)−˙(x ⊕ 2n−1) = ((a ⊕ x) − 2n−1)−˙(x + 2n−1) =
(((a ⊕ x) − 2n−1) − (x + 2n−1) + 2n) mod 2n = (a ⊕ x)−˙x; iii) When (a ⊕ x) < 2n−1 and x ≥ 2n−1:
(a ⊕ x ⊕ 2n−1)−˙(x ⊕ 2n−1) = ((a ⊕ x) + 2n−1)−˙(x − 2n−1) = (a ⊕ x)−˙x; iv) When (a ⊕ x) < 2n−1 and
x < 2n−1: (a⊕ x⊕ 2n−1)−˙(x⊕ 2n−1) = ((a⊕ x) + 2n−1)−˙(x+ 2n−1) = (a⊕ x)−˙x. Similarly, Eq. (13) can
be proved. 
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Corollary 3.1 means that one can only choose four intermediate sequences, J0, J1, J2 and J3, to break
MCKBA, where
J0(i) ≡ (
∑dn/3e−1
j=0
1 · 8j) mod 2n,
J1(i) ≡ (
∑dn/3e−1
j=0
7 · 8j) mod 2n, (14)
J2(i) ≡ (
∑dn/3e−1
j=0
4 · 8j) mod 2n,
J3(i) ≡ (
∑dn/3e−1
j=0
6 · 8j) mod 2n.
With respect to the 1D representation of 2D images defined in Sec. 2, basic repeated pattern of the corre-
sponding gray-scale images of J0, J1, J2 and J3 are [73, 146, 36], [255, 255, 255], [36, 73, 146], [182, 109, 219],
respectively. As shown in Proposition 1, the unknown most significant bits of key1 and/or key2 have no
influence on decryption of MCKBA, so they are considered being recovered correctly in rest of the paper.
Let key∗(i) denote solution of Eq. (5) for i = 0 ∼ MN/(2n)− 1, then {key∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 can be used as
an equivalent key to decrypt any cipher-images of smaller size, encrypted with the same secret key.
The complexity of the differential attack is mainly determined by verifying the n−1 bits of each element
in {key∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 from Table 3.1, so the complexity is proportional to the size of the plain-image.
3.2. Breaking the Secret Key
The differential attack described in the above subsection only outputs an equivalent key, which can only be
used to decrypt other cipher-images of smaller size than that of the chosen plain-images. To decrypt any
other cipher-image encrypted with the same secret key, we need to obtain the secret key. How to derive it
from the equivalent key will be discussed in this sub-section.
Assume {b(l)} distributes over {0, 1} uniformly, the probability key1 6∈ (key∗(i))8MN/n−1i=0 or key2 6∈
(key∗(i))8MN/n−1i=0 is (1/2)
8MN/n. So, we can obtain set (key1, key2) with a very high probability 1 −
(1/2)8MN/n−1. Since
∑n−2
j=0 (key1,j · 2j) 6=
∑n−2
j=0 (key2,j · 2j), one can narrow the scope of B(i) from Eq. (5)
as follows
B(i) ∈
{
{2, 3}, if ∑n−2j=0 (key∗(i)j · 2j) = ∑n−2j=0 (key1,j · 2j),
{0, 1}, if ∑n−2j=0 (key∗(i)j · 2j) = ∑n−2j=0 (key2,j · 2j), (15)
where key∗(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 (key
∗(i)j · 2j) and key∗(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 (key
∗(i)j · 2j).
Proposition 2. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers, n ∈ Z+, if a is odd, then p = ((au x)⊕ x) is
always odd and q = ((au x) x) is always even.
Proof. This proposition can be proved by two equations
((1 + x0) mod 2)⊕ x0 ≡ 1,
((1 + x0) mod 2) x0 ≡ 0.

From Proposition 2 and Eq. (2), one can narrow the scope of B(i) also according to encryption result
of the second chosen intermediate sequence shown in Eq. (14), as follows
B(i) ∈
{
{1, 3}, if J ′1(i) is odd,
{0, 2}, if J ′1(i) is even.
(16)
Once key1 and key2 are determined, value of B(i), for i = 0 ∼ 8MN/n − 1, can be determined
exactly from Eq. (15) and Eq. (16). There are only two possible combinations of key1 and key2. If the
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searched version is the right one, {B(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 can be constructed correctly. Let {B?(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 and
{B∗(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 denote the obtained version of {B(i)}8MN/n−1i=0 corresponding to the two combinations of
key1 and key2. Since Eq. (16) is unrelated with key1 and key2, one can assure that B
?(i) = B∗(i)⊕ 2, i.e,
b?(2i) = 1 − b∗(2i) and b?(2i + 1) = b∗(2i + 1), for i = 0 ∼ 8MN/n − 1. Construct {x?(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 and
{x∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 , where x?(i) =
∑32
j=1 b
?(32 · i+ j − 1) · 2−j , x∗(i) = ∑32j=1 b∗(32 · i+ j − 1) · 2−j .
Since {x(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 come from consecutive chaotic states generated by iterating Logistic map, we
can distinguish {x?(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 or {x∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 is the right sequence controlling encryption process,
and verify key1 and key2 correspondingly, by checking whether any two consecutive elements of them satisfy
specific correlation. As shown in [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007, Table 3], Eq. (1) is realized in 32-bit fixed-point
arithmetic precision. So MCKBA satisfies condition described in Proposition 3 with L = 32. The whole
secret key of MCKBA can be verified by checking whether some consecutive elements in {x?(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0
and {x∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 satisfy Eq. (17). Finally, key1, key2, and x(0) =
∑32
j=1 b(j − 1) · 2j can be recovered.
For HCKBA, we have to check which sequence agrees with distribution of the chaotic states generated by
the hyperchaos generator like [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010, Fig. 6].
Proposition 3. Assume that the Logistic map x(k+1) = µ ·x(k) ·(1−x(k)) is iterated with L-bit fixed-point
arithmetic and that x(k + 1) ≥ 2−m, where 1 ≤ m ≤ L. Then, the following inequality holds
|µ− µ˜k| ≤ 2m+3/2L, (17)
where µ˜k =
x(k+1)
x(k)·(1−x(k)) .
Proof. See appendix of [Li et al., 2008b]. 
3.3. Experimental Results
To verify the real performance of the above analysis, some experiments are carried out on some plain-images
of size 512×512 when n = 32. The four chosen plain-images are shown in Fig. 2. When x0 = 319684607/232,
key1 = 3835288501, and key2 = 1437224678, the encryption results of the four chosen-image are shown in
Fig. 3. Equivalent key {key∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 is used to decrypt another cipher-image shown in Fig. 4a) and
the recovered result is shown in Fig. 4b). In this case, the three parts of the whole secret key, key1, key2 and
the 32 bits of x(0) can be verified by checking only one pair of consecutive elements in {x?(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0
and {x∗(i)}MN/(2n)−1i=0 .
3.4. Some Remarks on the Performance of MCKBA
• Insufficient randomness of PRBS {b(l)}
It is well-known that distribution of chaotic states generated by iterating Logistic map is not uniform,
which makes randomness of derived binary bit sequence from them very low. As this point has been
shown quantitatively in [Li et al., 2007, 2004a], detailed discussion is omitted here.
• Insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image
This defect may cause serious threat for any secure image encryption algorithm since image and its
watermarked version may be encrypted at the same time. From Eq. (2), one can see that change of
the m-th significant bit of J(i) may only change the m ∼ (n − 1)-th significant bits of J ′(i), where
0 ≤ m < n. This means MCKBA can make change of one bit of plain-image to influence at most n bits
in the corresponding cipher-image.
• Insensitivity with respect to changes of two sub-keys
Obviously, any secure encryption algorithm should avoid this defect. Unfortunately, MCKBA is seriously
fragile in this aspect. From Eq. (2), one can see that change of the m-th significant bit of key1 or key2 only
influences the m ∼ (n−1)-th significant bits of the corresponding cipher-pixel. As shown in Proposition 1,
change of the most significant bit of key1 or key2 has no any influence on the whole decryption.
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a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 2. Four chosen plain-images (The black boundary of Fig. 2b) is not its part).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, security of the image encryption algorithm MCKBA has been studied in detail. It was found
that the whole secret key can be recovered correctly with only four chosen plain-images. In addition, some
other defects of the algorithm, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key,
were discussed. Analogue of MCKBA, HCKBA, has the same security problems. Due to such a low level
of security provided by the two algorithms (essentially one algorithm), their application in practice should
be performed with extreme caution.
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